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Clarke: Takings Clause

PRIVATE PROPERTY, THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
AND THE PURSUIT OF MARKET GAIN
by

CHARLES H. CLARKE*
INTRODUCTION

The Basic Issue - Two Models Of The Takings Clause
Essentially, the regulatory takings issue is a controversy over how much
private property and the public should get from each other. More for one is
likely to mean less for the other when the parties cannot agree upon fair shares.
Private property may be apprehensive that the public, through its regulatory
authority, the state, will try to get as much from private property as the state can
get, leaving private property with just enough to get along. The public, however,
may be equally apprehensive that always letting a laissez faire marketplace
allocate benefits will leave the public with just enough to get along, while private
property enjoys the rest.
The national experience before the Great Depression, and especially during
it, shows that a constitutional regime of laissez faire can inflict catastrophic losses
upon the public. Public apprehension of this system is well-founded. The
national experience with the modem welfare state, however, especially during the
last decade, shows that private property has little to fear from state power to
regulate private property to the point of a fair return.
This vast state regulatory power seems to work well when it is primarily
held in reserve. Ordinarily, the legislature does let the market allocate benefits.
State regulatory intervention occurs primarily when the market is unfair or cannot
do an adequate job.
Consequently, this Article proposes a fair return model for the takings
clause. This conception of the clause has been an operating principle of welfare
capitalism for decades. The Article rejects the model of laissez faire capitalism
that once dominated the landscape of the nation's constitutional system and may
come back again.

* Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law; B.A., Bethany College (1953); 1D., University of Chicago
Law School (1954).
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A FairReturn Model Of The Takings Clause
A fair return model of the takings clause I gives property owners a choice
when there is a known possibility, however slight or great, that what they want
to do with their property in the pursuit of market gain may bring loss to the
public. The choice is to forego the gain and find gain elsewhere or to proceed
and risk loss of investment principal from regulation to prevent loss to the public.
Ordinarily, public loss is simply the disappearance or reduction of a public benefit
that pursuit of market gain might foreclose.2
A landowner will almost always know whether a land use has the potential
to result in public loss, although it may appear that embarking upon the use
involves little or no risk to the public. This foreknowledge of the potential for
public loss gives him adequate notice of the possibility of state regulation to
prevent it. Occasionally, but rarely, knowledge of potential loss to the public
from a land use will not appear until after the landowner has committed his
investment principal. When this does occur, however, the survival choice
between loss of investment principal and loss of a public good should belong to
the legislature rather than the Supreme Court.
The balancing scales of the Supreme Court are incapable of weighing the
conflicting values in such a case.3 Letting the legislature make the hard survival
choice, however, presents no risk to a fair return upon capital overall. It simply
lets the representatives of the people decide which values are more important and
should be saved when something must be lost.
The Takings Clause And A Never-Ending Controversy
The takings clause has one certainty. It elicits sharp disagreement easily.
A look at the periodical literature about the takings clause reveals more work than
might be read in a lifetime. It is full of disagreement,4 Further, most of it
developed long after the Supreme Court had oiled the levers of power for the

'The applicable language of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides "[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsr. amend. V. The due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the states to observe the right that is secured by the
takings clause; Chicago B.& OJ?.R. v. City of Chicago 166 U.S. 226, 239-41 (1897). The relevant
language of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: "[N]or shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law..." U.S. CONST. amend

XIV, § 1.
2 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
3 See supra text accompanying notes 30-101 and 153-166.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1
4 See supra text accompanying notes 3-21.
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regulatory welfare state and was busily engaged in other matters. 5
Prestigious authors have disagreed over the clause and its great cases.
Professor Frank Michelman and Professor Lawrence Berger, for example, think

that severe regulatory loss of property to prevent a public loss from its use is6

unacceptable when the risk of public loss is a mere possibility at the outset.
Thus, they disapprove of Hadachek v. Sebastian7 which upheld an uncompensated regulatory shutdown of a brick factory because it foreclosed nearby
residential and related community development in Los Angeles, California.8
Professor Michelman also disagrees with Miller v. Schoene9 which permitted
Virginia to destroy beautiful red cedar trees without compensation because they
became infected with a rust disease that threatened apple orchards and the state's
apple industry with loss. 10

These two authors, then, appear to believe that the results of the marketplace in a situation like Hadachek will usually be fairer and better than
uncompensated legislative proscription to prevent loss to the public from a land
use. Further, Professor Michelman holds a similar view about what nature handed
out in Schoene.1 Although the two authors did not advocate laissez faire, they
did view the police power to regulate landowners from the perspective of
culpable, foreseeable loss that puts the landowner at fault for acting.1 2 This

'The Supreme Court noted some of the commentary and controversy about the takings clause, including
law review articles by Professor Frank Michelman, Professor Lawrence Berger and Professor Joseph Sax,
in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego 450 U.S. 621, 649-50 n.15 (1981), (dissenting
opinion of Justice Brennan which three other judges joined; Id. at 636). See supra text accompanying
notes 3-21.
6 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness; Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV L. REV. 1165, 1198-99, 1236-39, 1242-44 (1967); Berger, A Policy
Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 173-74, 195-96, 209-10 (1974). Professor
Michelman approves such a regulartory loss, however, in situations where the regulated property owner
should be able to understand that he would be better off in the long run accepting the loss; Michelman
at 1221-23; cf. Berger at 183-85.
7 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
8

Id. at 410. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1198-99, 1237-39, 1242-44; Berger supra note 6, at 173-74,
195-96, 209-10.

9 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
'0 Id. at 279. Michelman, supra note one p. 4 at 1198-99. Professor Michelman's position, which is
largely utilitarian, does not require state compensation for regulation that proscribes obvious wrongdoers
ans requires them to restore what they have taken from others. Id. at 1237-41. Failure to provide
compensation for the proscription of other property owners, however is likely to elicit subsequent
avoidance reactions from them that will impose costs upon the community. Id. at 1214. To avoid these
costs, then, the state should compensate the regulated property owners unless compensation would cost
the community more than absorbing the costs of the avoidance reaction of the property owners. Id. at
1215; cf Berger, at 182-83. Professor Michelman believes that compensation is clearly required in
Hadacheck v. Sebastian; Michelman, supra note 6, at 1237, 1241-45. He also thinks that Miller v.
Schoene is a similar case. Id. at 1198-99.
Michelman, supra note 6, at 1198-99.
12

Michelman, supra note 6, at 1236-39; Berger, supra note 6 at 174.
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conception of the police power might make severe land regulation primarily a
scourge for traditional criminals and tortfeasors although the market itself can
occasionally inflict sizeable losses upon the public.
Professor Richard Epstein, however, does advocate a constitutional regime
of laissez faire. 3 He would also constitutionally limit a substantial part of the
police power to what the common law of nuisance would let the state suppress. 4
Consequently, he approves Hadachek, 5 but seriously doubts that Schoene
satisfies this standard.16 Further, Professor Epstein disagrees with Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company 7 which upheld zoning in place of the helterskelter system of land use development that the common law of nuisance
bestowed upon the community.' 8 But he does approve Pennsylvania Coal
Company v. Mahon 9 which held that the coal industry had a constitutional right
to destroy inhabited communities in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania in
conducting mining operations, after having bought and paid for the property right
to do so.20
Merely listing all relevant articles and titles about the takings clause would
require several pages. Some authors, however, do prefer a construction of the
clause that would accommodate the needs of the regulatory welfare state.
Professor Joseph Sax, for example, has a conception of the police power and the
takings clause that would let the legislature make the hard choices that the
inevitable conflict between property interests and other interests require.2 '
Thus, the takings clause and its four great cases, Schoene, Hadachek,Euclid
and Mahon have brought the nation a disarray of academic opinion and some
enduring constitutional law. The disarray of academic opinion is ironic. Much
of it seems to propose the solutions of the marketplace rather than the legislature
for some serious problems. Yet the court that decided the four great cases had
the philosophic outlook of Justice George Sutherland, architect, master builder and
guardian of a constitutional regime of laissez faire that only the Great Depression

" Epstein, Takings: Private Property And The Power Of Eminent Domain (1985); see Grey, "The
MalthusianConstitution",41 U. MIAIu L.REV. 21 (1986); Tribe, American Constitutional Law, p. 606-07,
n.6 (1988).
Epstein, supra note 13, at 112-21.
14

'

Id. at 118-21.

6

Id. at 113-14, 118.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
'a Id. at 394-97; Epstein, supra note 13, at 131-34.
'

17

'9 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
20 Id. at 414. Epstein, supra note 13. at 63-64. See also Epstein, Takings: Descent And Resurrection,

1987 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 5-23 (1987).
See Sax, Takings, Private PropertyAnd PublicRights, 81 YALE LI. 149, 163-69, 176 (1971); Takings

21

And The Police Power, 1964 YALE L.J. 36, 49, 63, 67,
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1

(1964).
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and New Deal, with great difficulty, managed to bring to an end.22
This most conservative Supreme Court, in other words, has some conservative critics who think that the Court gave away too much private property to the
police power. In a sense, the critics are right This Court was quite ready to
permit sacrifice of property interests when the sacrifice was necessary to
accommodate its conception of a limited police power. So, the Court upheld
Hadachek and Euclid to allow more amenable living conditions in modem urban
industrial areas than the common law of nuisance would permit.23 But this
Court drew the line at Mahon because it thought that the state in Mahon was
giving away private property on an enormous scale to provide the people of
anthracite coal communities a place to live.24
Still, a true believer in laissez faire might well have some uneasiness with
the Court's system of laissez faire. It seemed to have a few uncomfortable
legislative distinctions,2 s and its minor lapses into liberalism authorized severe
regulatory destruction of property. In fact, all that had to happen was for Mahon
to come out the other way2 6 and the legislature would have a free hand to
govem the marketplace.2 7
As matters happened, after the legislature did get a free hand to govern the
marketplace, Mahon did come out the other way. But the irony of the great cases
of the takings clause persisted, nevertheless. Mahon was barely discarded in a 5/4
decision in which the four dissenting judges seemed to prefer some constitutional
role for the law of the marketplace.
Moreover, the great precedents of the takings clause are capable of doing

22

Paschal, Mr. Justice Sutherland, A Man Against The State, 236-37, 244-45 (1951).

Dunham and

Kurkland, Mr. Justice, 203 (1964). Justice Sutherland wrote the opinion of the Court in Adlins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 559 (1923) (holding a minimum wage law for women unconstitutional), overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). He wrote the plurality
opinion in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 278, 307-10 (1936) (holding that congress' power to
regulate commerce does not extend to labor relations in the coal industry), overruled in United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941). Justice Sutherland also wrote the dissenting opinion for four justices
in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (1934) which upheld state mortgage
moratorium legislation during the Great Depression. Further, see supra text accompanying notes 129-142.
Justice Sutherland was appointed to the Court in 1922 after Hadachek v. Sebastian 239 U.S. 394
(1915). See 260 U.S. at iii. He participated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
Miller v. Schoene 276 U.S. 272 (1928), and he wrote the opinion of the court in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926). Id. at iii.
23See supra text accompanying notes 45-82.
24 See
2

supra text accompanying notes 78-83.

See supra text accompanying notes 126-134.

26 Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. De Benedictis 480 U.S. 470 (1987); See supra text accompanying

notes 93-120.
27 Id. at 507; See supra text accompanying notes 214-241.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1992
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more for the regulatory welfare state than letting it govem the marketplace. All
that one has to do is look at Miller v. Schoene,2 8 the cedar rust case, through the
magnifying glass of the regulatory welfare state, and it might permit the
legislature to prescribe regulatory loss of a private multi-million dollar dam to
save the snail darter or a more valuable, private old-growth forest to save the
northern spotted owl. 2 9 These results might be disquieting to some conservatives, even if they were well-established.
This panorama of intellectual challenge and controversy happened to be
entirely academic when the Supreme Court observed the divergence of viewpoint
among legal scholars, en passant, in a footnote, some time ago. 30 But the
controversy has not remained academic. A new and different Supreme Court may
31
be thinking about bringing back freedom of contract as a constitutional right,
and a laissez faire construction of the takings clause would facilitate this
objective.3 2
Consequently, the fundamental disagreement about the great precedents of
the takings clause may inform the decision in what may be the most important
controversial controversy of the century. The modem American welfare state may
soon be fighting for its life in the Supreme Court, itself, where a liberal
legislature cannot save it. Its continued existence may depend upon the judgment
of five or six Supreme Court judges whose philosophic outlook will likely run in
the opposite direction.
This Article will discuss these matters approximately in the order in which
they have been set forth. The great cases of the takings clause is the place to
begin. They will not be taken up chronologically. Miller v. Schoene3 3 will be
presented first.
Miller v. Schoene 4 - The Cedar Rust Case
In Miller v. Schoene, 35 red cedar trees were the host plant of a rust disease
that was harmless to the host, but fatal to any apple orchards that happened to be

28 276 U.S. 272 (1928).

29See supra text accompanying notes 153-166.
30

San Diego Gas & Electric Company v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 650-51 (1981) (dissenting

opinion of Justice Brennan which three other judges joined; Id. at 636). See supra note 5, and text
accompanying notes 3-5.
31See supra text accompanying notes 212-243.
32 Id.
33 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
3 4 Id.
35

id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1
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nearby.36 To protect its apple industry from loss, Virginia authorized the
uncompensated destruction of the cedar trees when they were dangerously close
to an apple orchard. 7 The Supreme Court upheld the statute when it was
challenged by an owner of red cedar trees.
The Court's explanation for its unanimous decision was a model of clarity
and simplicity. After observing that the state was confronted with the choice of
preserving one class of property or another class, the Court said: "When forced
to such a choice, the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding
which, in
upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another
38
the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.
But counsel for the owner of the cedar trees had offered the Court a
different choice. He proposed a nle that would have compelled the state to let
the loss lie where it would have fallen or to compensate the owner of the cedar
trees for the loss of his trees. 39 The choice open to the state under this rule
would have been to absorb the smaller of two losses to the state's interests.
Thus, counsel for the owner of the cedar trees explained that the owner was
not at fault or responsible for their harmful condition 0 and, consequently, that
fundamental fairness should not permit the state to prevent the loss of nearby
apple orchards by causing the loss of his trees unless, of course, the state wanted
to buy them. 41 The loss of the apple orchards, unfair as it might be, should
remain where it would fall unless the state paid compensation for diverting it to
him. Thus the rule and rationale proposed by counsel of the owner of the cedar
trees were as clear as the work product of the Court.
In essential agreement with the argument of counsel, Professor Michelman
would treat the possible loss of the apple orchards as though the destructive agent
had fallen out of the sky. 2 But loss that falls out of the sky is not the same as
loss that has a property source. When loss falls out of the sky, a sacrifice of
'6Id. at 278.
37 Id. at 277-78.

'aId. at 279.
39Id. at 274-75 (argument for plaintiff in error).
40

Id. at 274. The Court said that the state's power to destroy the red cedar trees did not depend upon

whether they were a nuisance at common law or could be declared a nuisance by statute; Id. at 280.
4' Id. at 274 (argument for plaintiff in error). Counsel also argued that destruction of the red cedar trees
was a taking of property for a private purpose rather than a public purpose and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional even if the state provided .compensation for the trees; Id. at 274-75.
42

Professor Michelman says that Miller v. Schoene is not essentially different from the hypothetical

situation "in which the apple pest spent its whole life in the apple trees but could be exterminated only
by some arcane components, to furnish which the cedar stands were condemned without compensation."

See Michelman supra note 6, at 1198-99. The cedar trees, in the hypothetical situation, however, are not

Published
1992nor
the sourceby
ofIdeaExchange@UAkron,
the loss of the apple trees,

would they be the source if the loss fell down from the sky.
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property that is the source of a loss is not available to prevent loss of property
that would be the natural recipient of loss from the source.
Miller v. Schoene, however, is an example of the rare situation where the
risk of loss remains unknown until the loss becomes imminent and makes some
kind of loss unavoidable. In this situation, it is irrelevant, beforehand, to property
owners as a group whether the loss falls upon source property or recipient
property. The risk of being a source is the same as the risk of being a recipient.
Therefore, it seems sensible for the state to let the loss fall where it will have the
least harmful fallout on the public, which is what Miller v. Schoene did.
The situation would be slightly different if the world's most valuable and
privately owned cyclotron, to the complete surprise of everyone, suddenly
threatened to kill off large populations of birds. Under these circumstances,
private property would not be the recipient of any loss. Further, directing the loss
to private property, namely, the cyclotron, would impose a sacrifice upon private
property that it would avoid if the loss were to remain where events would place
it without anyone's fault.
Still a constitutional rule that would compel the state to leave this loss from
property where it would fall or to pay full compensation for the regulatory loss
to prevent it might impose too much hardship upon the ordinary citizen, whether
he or she is called the general taxpayer, the public or simply labor. Loss from
private property, regulatory loss to private property to prevent it and loss from
paying compensation to prevent regulatory loss all arise out of the risks of living
close together in a community where private property, labor and environment are
mutually interdependent. These losses arise from the operations of the whole
economic life-support system. Therefore, the state should have the power to
allocate these losses among the parts of the system in a way that will result in the
least misery.43
A tax increase to pay compensation for a regulatory loss to the owner of the
cyclotron might take too much away from the general taxpayer. Similarly, the
general public might not want to give up the birds. The owner of the cyclotron
and the public, however, might be able to get along without the cyclotron.
Further, the owner of the cyclotron did own property that was the source of
the loss. He enjoyed the benefits of its ownership exclusively because the public
paid for whatever benefits it received from the cyclotron unless its owner gave
them away. Consequently, placing the loss from the cyclotron upon its owner
would not single him out for a mindless sacrifice.

43 See supra text accompanying notes 153-166.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1
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Mindlessness is far easier found in nature, itself, or in the operations of the
marketplace. The owners of private property should not have a constitutional
right to expose the public to the unknown and unavoidable risks of loss that can
arise from their operations. It is reasonable, then, under the circumstances, to
place upon the owner of the cyclotron a loss that is the fault of nobody."
The economic life-support system rather than human fault is responsible for
the loss. It does not follow from this, however, that the general taxpayer should
foot either the bill or the consequences. Legislative allocation of the loss rather
than accepting what comes naturally or paying full compensation to the owner of
private property is likely to be the best way of placing the loss where it will cause
the least misery.
Recognition of this legislative power,45 however, requires the legislature
to be the exclusive judge of whether it should be exercised. No judicial calculus
can possibly measure the consequences of exercising or not exercising this power.
A predatory state, however, could not use this power as a pretext for making
periodic raids upon private property. Exercise of the power would be limited to
addressing risks of loss that have an identifiable source, are unknowable
beforehand and make loss unavoidable when they become known. Such risks
rarely arise.
Thus, the marketplace itself can inflict loss upon the public and make some
amenities less available. Most of the risks of the marketplace are known,
however, even though their magnitude extends from a mere possibility to
something clearly foreseeable. Because the owner or private property can avoid
these risks, he does not have a strong claim for demanding that the public accept
loss from them when they materialize. Hadachek v. Sebastian4 6 shows what is
meant.
Hadachek v. Sebastian - The Brick Factory Case47
Hadachek operated a brick factory upon an eight-acre tract of land that he
acquired in 1902.48 Initially, the tract was beyond the city limits of Los
Angeles, California.49 Eventually, urban expansion and the city limits overtook
the brick factory.50 Eight years after he acquired the tract, the city enacted an
4Id.

" See supra text accompanying notes 153-162.
46 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
47

Id.

48 Id. at 408.
49 Id. at 405, 408.
so Id.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1992
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ordinance that shut down the brick factory without compensation because it had
halted residential development upon the three square miles of nearby land.51
The ordinance dropped the value of the brick factory land from $800,000 to
$60,000 in 1910 dollar values.52 The Supreme Court upheld the ordinance.53
People did not want to live in the brick factory smoke.-" Also, a real
estate developer who could buy out Hadachek and develop the area at a
reasonable profit seemed conspicuously missing. The cost of a reasonable buyout
was probably prohibitive. This would have made a buyout with special
assessments equally futile. Undoubtedly, the general taxpayers would have been
reluctant to subsidize a buyout for housing consumers who could afford to buy
housing for themselves. Residential and related community development simply
was not going to occur as long as the brick factory remained where it was. Either
it had to go or people who wanted to go where it was had to go elsewhere.
There was also another brick factory in the same land district where
56
55
The city ordinance shut it down, too.
Hadachek manufactured bricks.
Perhaps it also smoked up three square miles of comparable land. A constitutional right to a state buyout for the owners of these and similar brick factories
would have removed a large amount of real estate from the housing market. The
loss of this land would have had its consequences in 1910, before widespread use
of the automobile, when use of the horse and buggy or wagon was still an
everyday occurrence.
Housing consumers would have had to live closer to the city, possibly in
apartments which they wanted to escape, or farther away from the city, with a
long commute on the interburban if there was on, or by less desirable means if
there was not one. Housing costs probably would have increased. Consumers
probably would have paid more and received less, including less amenable
neighborhoods in which to live. All in all, that is quite a bit for the owner of a
brick factory to expect from the community as the price for conducting his
operations, especially when there seemed to be ample brick factories in Los
Angeles that did not disrupt community life in any way.57
But Hadachek did have something to say in his own behalf. He said that
after he acquired the brickland, urban expansion simply fell down upon him from

"

Id. at 406, 409-10. The ordinance was enacted in 1910; Exparte Hadachek 132 p. 584 585 (1913).
U.S. at 405.

52 239
53

Id. at 410, 414.

54

Id. at 406, 409-10.

"

Id. at 406.

56 Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1
17 Id. at 406, 413.
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out of the sky. Upon acquisition of the eight-acre tract, "he did not expect or
believe, nor did other owners of property in the vicinity expect or believe, that the
territory would be annexed by the city." 58 He also thought that only "an
extremely small amount of smoke" was "emitted from any kiln" in his brickyard.59 It can be assumed, nevertheless, for the purpose of discussion, that what
happened to Hadachek seemed beyond the realm of possibility when he made his
purchase. No matter how unlikely or likely this assumption may seem, it does
not weaken the case for the state.
A risk that seems beyond the realm of possibility is not much of a risk for
a capital entrepreneur to take, considering that he does not have to take any risk
at all and that severe consequences will fall upon someone if the risk does
materialize. An industrial entrepreneur who does not want to risk his venture
capital on a known risk that seems beyond the realm of possibility should stay out
of the market, just as a member of the family who cannot stand the heat should
stay out of the kitchen. If the entrepreneur does choose to go into the market,
however, then any gain that turns up, including a gain that seemed beyond the
realm of possibility, should be his. But the same should also be true for any loss
that turns up, including a loss that seemed beyond the realm of possibility, even
though it arose from a risk that seemed safe enough for the entrepreneur to try to
thrust upon the community instead of taking it himself.
The trouble with market risks that seem beyond the realm of possibility is
that they materialize so frequently that one should not take such a risk unless he
is also prepared to take its adverse consequences. The community did not want
any risks that might arise out of Hadachek's brick factory. The Supreme Court
correctly held that it did not have to accept any.
Recognition of state regulatory power to destroy the brick factory in
Hadachek v. Sebastian, however, does not suggest that the state should have
unlimited discretion to choose between incompatible land uses. It does not follow
from Hadachek v. Sebastian, for example, that desire for a new brick factory
would permit the state to let an entrepreneur build it and blitz an existing
residential neighborhood or even a few isolated houses without compensation
from the entrepreneur or the state. Residential development does not preclude
needed brick factories the way that some brick factories can preclude needed
residential development.
Finding an efficient industrial site for making bricks does not require setting

58Id. at 405.

IId. at 406.
6The

population of the city of Los Angeles, California was 50,395 in 1890, 102,479 in 1900 and 319,198

in 1910. 2 THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
Published
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a brick factory down in an existing residential area. It is also possible to locate
a brick factory near a few existing houses without imposing an uncompensated
loss upon the homeowners. The owner of the brick factory would expect a large
gain from his enterprise. He could use some of it to compensate the homeowners.
Profitable business operations do not require the severe destruction of private
property or the episodic imposition of general loss upon the public.
It is true that the common law of nuisance permitted uses of substantial
incompatibility next to each other although one use might noticeably reduce the
value of an existing use.61 These results, however, were due to flaws in the
common law and the free market for real estate transactions. They required the
cure of central planning by local government. The cure was zoning, and it was
provided by a Supreme Court that was firmly committed to
laissez faire. The
62
Company.
Realty
Ambler
v.
Euclid
of
Village
cure came in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company" Zoning and Efficiency, Compatibility and
Amenities for Neighborhoods
A community may be satisfied with the advantages and disadvantages of a
common law system of land use controls. Houston, Texas is one noticeable
example. 64 But the widespread adoption of zoning in large metropolitan areas
speaks well for zoning. The adoption of zoning, however, is not cost-free.
Zoning can inflict large disproportionate loss upon some landowners. The loss
can approach loss allowed by the free market and the common law of nuisance
as supplemented by the legislative power to suppress the preclusive use that the
case of Hadachek v. Sebastian authorizes.
Thus, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, a real estate broker
stood upon his own land to the east of Cleveland, Ohio, and what his eye could
see brought joy to his heart. He could see a stream of industrial and commercial
development moving toward him from Cleveland, 5 and it was going to run over

6'1 The

common law of nuisance did not prevent a landowner from making a use of his land merely

because it would reduce that value of another person's land; See REINSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Sec. 822, 826, 827 (1977). Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) shows
that prior to land use zoning, single-family residential areas were at risk to invasion by retail stores, other
businesses, apartments and perhaps an occasional industrial establishment; Id. at 388. Sometimes,
apartments would make an area useless for detached residences; Id. at 394.
62 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
63

id.

"On Jan. 10, 1991, the City of Houston, Texas, enacted ordinance no. 91-63, which created a planning
and zoning commission and authorzied land use planning and zoning. Prior to the enactment of this
ordinance, Houston had been the largest city in the nation without zoning; 14 Encyclopedia Americana
499, (International Ed. 1989).
63 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, INTERNATIONAL EDmIION,
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1

651 (1989).

12

Clarke: Takings Clause
Summer, 19911

TAKINGS CLAUSE

the very ground upon which he stood.6 6 He would soon be rich. Then, the
Village of Euclid enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance that diverted some
of this horn of plenty to other landowners.67
When this happened, the Village consisted of twelve to fourteen square
miles of largely undeveloped acreage and a population of between five thousand
and ten thousand persons.68 Whether or not zoning made the real estate broker
poor, he did end up being considerably less rich. He lost 75% of the value of
some of his land, compared to Hadachek's 92.5% loss. 69 But both Hadachek
and the broker were going to stop or divert urban residential development.
Whoever dislikes Hadachek v. Sebastian, then, also has to dislike Euclid.
The benefits of zoning are impressive, nevertheless. Zoning minimizes the
disharmony and disutility of incompatible land uses. It brings residential districts
with detached, single-family homes and beautiful, serene, shady, tree-lined streets
where children can safely play, and adults can relax nearby, free from noisy
apartments, the clang and clatter of the shopping district, the howl of the
industrial zone and the nervous disorders
and other ill effects that follow in the
70
wake of all of this tumult and traffic.
Zoning also maximizes real estate values overall.7' It is true that the price
for these benefits is the displacement of the free market with government
planning. But surely a few persons do not have a constitutional right to insist
upon free market operations when they will leave almost everyone worse off. It
is difficult to make a strong case for the constitutional right to make things a
mess. The discomfort of life in an urban industrial community without zoning,
however, might be much greater than that threatened by the continued operation
of Hadachek's brick factory. Undoubtedly, the disadvantages of the common law
of nuisance and the free market for real estate transactions gave enough notice to
participants in this market that the applicable law might change.
These disadvantages, however, may not have existed in Euclid at all.
Instead, the situation in Euclid seemed like a landowner's dream almost come true
until the landowners, themselves decided to adopt zoning and let the dream pass
them by. Perhaps they had a different dream.

66 272 U.S. at 384-85.
6 id. at 379-80, 384-85.

Id. at 379.
69

Id. at 384, see supra text accompanying notes 48-56.

70 Id.
7'

at 394.

See HAGMAN & JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, 62

(1988 Ed.).
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In Euclid, distinguished counsel for Ambler Realty said that industry wanted
to buy every square foot of land in the village.72 This submission might have
been hyperbole, but the court decided to rule upon it anyhow.73 The court
necessarily held that zoning can be constitutional when it reduces the value of
everyone's land, of the land of voters who do not want this to happen to their
land, as well as the land of voters who are eager to reduce the value of their own
land.
The facts of the case do not reveal the landowners who were the beneficiaries of Euclid's zoning plan or exactly what all of its benefits were. Surely the
sale of undeveloped acreage for factory use would have brought its owners
enough money to have purchased a residence with suitable spacious grounds
somewhere else in the Cleveland area. Further, the owners of improved property
in the village probably would have had a similar opportunity to increase their net
worth.
Perhaps the existing residents, however, were afraid that they might become
an isolated, valueless residential pocket in a huge expanse of industrial development. Possibly, all residents of the village believed that, in union, there was
strength, and they decided to present a united front in the form of a zoning
ordinance to prevent industrial purchasers from picking them off one at a time for
much less money than negotiated sales on an area basis would bring. Maybe the
residents of the village wanted to save us much of its rural character and charm
as an enhanced industrial tax base would allow, while making the necessary
compromise to accommodate the needs of heavy industry.
Conceivably, a village like Euclid might have matchless charm that would
be enhanced by the bright lights and cultural attractions of the big city next door.
The residents of the village might have all of the pleasures of two different
worlds at their fingertips.74 In any event, Euclid allowed the state to require
some landowners to forego potential gain from land so that other persons could
enjoy better living conditions in urban metropolitan areas.

There are limits, naturally, to the potential gain that the state can command
landowners to forego in the interest of better living conditions for other persons.
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon,7 5 which was decided before Euclid but

72 Newton D. Baker, who was President Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of War during World War I, was

counsel for Ambler Realty Company; 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, INTERNATIONAL EDITION, 68 (1988
Ed.); 272 U.S. at 371, 374 (argument for appellee).
7' 272 U.S. at 389-90.
74

See supra text accompanying notes 194-211.

75260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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after Hadachek, set forth some limits. In Euclid and Hadachek, a few landowners
claimed the constitutional right to shape the character and future of the
community with free market transactions. Their effort failed. In Mahon, a few
landowners contracted to take away the long-term future of numerous coal
communities. Their effort was crowned with success.
Euclid was different than Mahon, nevertheless. In Mahon, all of the
landowners wanted to sell out.7" Further, the court did not allow state intervention in Mahon to prevent loss of community and a living place within it for future
generations.77 Their interests had been bargained away before they could be
consulted or do anything about it. There was nothing that they or anyone else
could do about it anyway. It was none of their business. It was none of the
state's business either.78
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon79 Coal Communitikes On Top Of A Collapsible
Fee Simple Absolute
Mahon is from a completely different world than the America of today.
The decision itself was harsh when life was not easy. Perhaps the rough and
tumble temper of the times and the outlook that shaped the Mahon judges may
help to account for the outcome in the case. Even so, some readers have always
been unable to read the opinion without setting it down in utter disbelief.
In acquiring the right to mine coal in the anthracite region of Pennsylvania,
the coal industry let other persons own the land surface in the anthracite locations,
hamlets, villages, town and cities in the state.8 0 The coal industry naturally
reserved the right to mine the coal. Further, the industry, reluctant to leave any
money unnecessarily lying in the ground, also reserved the right to mine away the
coal support pillars that helped to keep the anthracite communities above
ground.8
Understandably, the day came when the legislature forbade removal of the
coal support pillars.82 Litigation ensued over the constitutionality of what the
legislature had done. The rest is constitutional history.

76

Id. at 412, 414-16. See supra text accompanying notes 121-128.

nId. at 414-16.
7' Id. at 414.
79 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
SOId. at 412-414.
81Id.
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The Supreme Court, with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. as it
spokesman, held that legislative prohibition of a mining practice that threatened
destruction of the anthracite communities violated the takings clause of the
Constitution. 3 The holding meant that the support pillars had to be bought and
paid for if support for the surface was desired. It was unlikely, of course, that the
value of the surface with improvements was much more than the value of the
support pillars and, quite possibly, the surface was worth a lot less. However, if
something worth the purchase price of a home was required to retain an existing
home in an anthracite community, then it might have been advisable to locate one
as far away from a coal mine as possible. The ruling in Mahon simply meant
that collapsible fee interests in the surface throughout the anthracite communities
would collapse after prudent completion of terminal coal mining operations.
Mahon, obviously, is not a natural companion of Hadachek or Euclid. The
latter two cases permit a large regulatory reduction of property interests to allow
residential and related community development to begin. Mahon, on the other
hand, disallows a comparable state reduction of property interests to allow such
development to last after it is in place.
One apparent difference between Mahon and the other two cases is that
property owners in Mahon were well-paid for consenting in advance to loss of
their property interests. Their counterparts in Hadachek and Euclid, on the other
hand, did not bargain away residential and related community development to
industrial enterprise. Upon examination, however, the presence or absence of
consent to what the state tried to prevent in all three cases does not seem to
distinguish Mahon.
Arguably, this suggested difference might be important if all that the coal
industry had wanted to do in Mahon was to construct mining camps and then
demolish them after there was nothing more to mine. Mining camps, after all, do
not have much capacity for acquiring a lasting life of their own run. Further, a
mining camp can be as spartan or as elegant as the employer desires. The gold
fields in Alaska often had tents and saloons with attached appurtenances. It is
also possible for mining camps to have well-ventilated dormitories, dining halls,
recreational facilities and areas where visitors can be received.
The coal industry of Pennsylvania, however, did not prefer such arrangements. Instead, the industry wanted ordinary communities, complete with
everything that ordinary community life has. Laying out towns and cities or
deciding how long they will last, of course is traditional subject matter of the

3 Id. at 415.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1
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police power.8 Today, an attempt by industry to do what the coal industry
arranged in Mahon probably would not survive the initial encounter with the
appropriate land use planning authority. The law is that private parties cannot
reduce the power of the state to govern a matter by making a contract about it. 5
The law is that the police power cannot be bargained away by the state itself.8 6
Still, what the coal industry wanted to do in Mahon might have conformed
to these controlling propositions of law if its operations had been relatively shortterm. The industry, however, waited two generations to pull out the support
pillars beneath some anthracite communities 7 and nearly a century before it
began to lay waste to some of the bituminous coal communities in the southwestern part of the state. 88
The power to destroy the land surface of huge areas of northeastern and
southwestern Pennsylvania and to uproot and displace a substantial part of the
state's population, after two or three generations, does not resemble ordinary
short-term mining operations. The Mahon Court, however, did not directly
address the constitutional legitimacy of this vast amount of traditional government
power that the coal industry had reserved for itself and wanted to keep. Instead,
the court's judgment in Mahon resembled disposition of a petty land dispute
between two private parties because one of them unjustifiably thought that he had
made a bad bargain for his interest in Blackacre.8 9
Many communities have the power to exist long after exhaustion of the
forces that created them. This is as true for factory towns as for mining towns.
Dawson City is still in the Yukon even if the faint traces of its once prosperous
gold industry are now primarily tourist attractions. Other communities have made
comparable adjustments. Some of these communities succeeded because their
infrastructure did not expire with the death of their founding industries.
The conflict between the interests of private property and the public in
Mahon was like the similar conflicts in Hadacheck and Euclid. The question in
all three cases was whether the community needed living space more than

" Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (a private corporation must observe the constitution when
it operates a company town, including provision of municipal services, and it cannot prevent handbilling
in the streets of the town.).
83

Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349. 357 (1908).

6 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880); United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431

U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977) reh den, 431 U.S. 475 (1977); ".Nowak & R. Rotunda, CoNsTrfLmONAL LAW 39899 (4th Ed. 1991).
"7 The deed that reserved the right to mine the coal support pillars for the Mahon property was executed

in 1878. 260 U.S. at 412.
8 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictics 480 U.S. 470, 478 (1987).
89 260 U.S.
at 415.
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industrial space in a particular land area. Further, it is not completely clear that
Mahon, overall, gave constitutional protection to interests of greater dollar value
than the interests whose destruction it authorized. Moreover, the balance of
interests struck by the court seems warped if the different values of family,
hearth, home and community are thrown into the weighing scales.
The private property and contractual arrangements in Mahon were meant to
prevent this kind of balancing from ever occurring at all. Such a weighing
process required the factor that the Pennsylvania legislature eventually provided.
It was that protection of community interests required support rights for the
surface even though they could only come from part of a coal seam that had
already been sold for coal.
This legislature adjustment would have prevented use of the coal support
pillars as coal by anyone unless the surface and subsurface owners agreed. The
surface owners would not have agreed unless life would have been the same or
better for them after the agreement. There would have been no agreement in
economically viable coal communities if it meant giving up a satisfactory life
there for an uncertain life elsewhere.
One might reply, however, that such an arrangement would permit some
surface owners to hold out for a king's ransom. Denying the existence of this
possibility would be foolish, of course, but it vastly underrates the tremendous
motive power of money and the desire to add some of it to one's larder or, at
least, to preserve what one has without losing the opportunity by foolishly
insisting upon a regal sum. Holdouts did not prevent the Mahon arrangements
from being made initially. They would have been no barrier subsequently if the
relevant economic forces were propitious. Besides, the Pennsylvania legislature
could have intervened again and let residual coal mining work matters out if
something whimsical got in the way of economic or other good sense.
Permitting the interplay of economic forces that the Pennsylvania legislature
set in motion in Mahon, however, might seem to be a taking of the coal
industry's support pillars. One can wonder, nevertheless, whether there would
have been any ascertainable loss if the value of the lost interests were measured
when the coal mining arrangements were first made. Fixing value this way would
involve the value to remove residual coal a half or whole century after mining
operations began. Whatever these rights were worth then, they seem very distant
from money in the bank.
It should make no difference, however, whether these rights initially were
a purse of gold or a gambler's chance. One can assume that the value of the
residual mining rights was as measurable when they were created as when the
Pennsylvania legislature foreclosed them. However value and loss are calculated,

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1
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the loss is not different from the loss in Hadachek v. Sebastian" or Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.9' In all three cases, private property had the right
to seriously disrupt community life, absent legislature intervention. Profitable
brickmaking, steel mills and automobile factories, however, did not require
serious disruption of community life. The same was also true of profitable coal
mining.
Moreover, what the Pennsylvania legislature did in Mahon, as well as what
the coal industry did initially arguably made good sense. Arrangements were
made to mine anthracite coal in Pennsylvania long before the turn of the
century.92 Looking fifty or a hundred years ahead, leaving coal support pillars
in the ground for ghost towns might turn out to be an enormous waste, but so
might wasting the community just to get the support pillars. Thus, looking ahead
from the outset, the appropriateness of removing the support pillars would
ultimately depend upon the acceptability of slash and bum coal mining to the
community or to the supreme court of the United States. Either way, the coal
industry did not have a sure thing.
Thus, the arrangements for mining coal in Mahon were made to last a
century or longer, if necessary. What the community would look like and what
interests it would seek to protect from mining one hundred years ahead required
considerably more foresight than Hadachek possibly could have had when he fired
up his brick factory at the turn of the century only eight years before it was
closed. Both should have considered the possibility of the development of a
different community than the one on which they bet their money.
The greatest surprise in Mahon was its constitutional blessing for an
extremely destructive coal mining practice. That this constitutional right lasted
as long as it did is almost equally surprising. The residual mining fights in
Mahon were always a gambler's chance. 93 Eventually, the Supreme Court took
the chance away. The decision that did this likely brought disappointment to the
coal industry, but genuine surprise seems out of the question. Attention will now
turn to decision that took away this gambler's chance.

90 239 U.S. 394 (1915).

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
93480 U.S. at 478. The Mahons' deed in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922)
was executed in 1878.
'The anthracite mining at issue in Mahon was secondary or residual mining; 260 U.S. at 406, (argument
for Pennsylvania); see Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why The Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle 57 S. CAL.
L. REv. by
561,IdeaExchange@UAkron,
578-79 (1984).
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Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De Benedictis4 The Modification of Mahon
The primary difference between Keystone and Mahon is that Keystone arose
in the bituminous coal region of southwestern Pennsylvania whereas Mahon
involved the anthracite region in the northeastern part of the state. In both cases,
the coal industry had made the same arrangements for the coal, the coal support
pillars and the surface. 95 The Pennsylvania legislature forbade removal of the
support pillars to protect the economic viability of coal communities in both
cases 96 and to protect the environment in Keystone. The coal industry, to the
great surprise of nobody, said that Keystone97 was a replay of Mahon.98
The coal industry in Keystone simply claimed that the law forbidding
removal of the bituminous coal support pillars was unconstitutional on its face" .
Stated another way, the law had no valid applications. 10 The Court bluntly
rebuffed this facial challenge on the ground that the law did not preclude
profitable bituminous coal mining.' 0 '
This riposte, however, failed to explain why the ruling in Mahon did not
have a valid application in Keystone. Mahon had held that the law prohibiting
removal of the coal support pillars was unconstitutional "so far as it affects the
mining of coal under streets or cities where the right to mine such coal has been
reserved. ' °2 The Keystone Court was able to overcome the obstacle presented
by this ruling, however. The court explained that the ruling was non-binding.
The sole complaining parties in Mahon were the owners of a single house
9 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
9 Id. at 478; 260 U.S. at 412, 414.
480 U.S. at 485-86, 488. Justice Brandeis. the sole dissenter in Mahon, would have upheld the
challenged law as a safety measure. 260 U.S. at 420. Considering the likely response of the Supreme
Court to the argument that the economic welfare of the anthracite coal communities justified a severe
regulatory destruction of property rights, the parties who supported the challenged law did emphasize the
peril to public safety of removing the subsurface support for populated areas; 260 U.S. 404-06, argument
for Pennsylvania. Still, it was clear to the parties and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the economic
well-being of the coal communities was at stake; Id. at 405-06, 409, 411; Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal
Co. 118 A. 491, 492-95 (1922). The four dissenting justices in Keystone thought that both Keystone and
Mahon involved substantially the same state objectives, including protection of the economic welfare of
the community. 480 U.S. at 509-11.
9

480 U.S. at 485-86, 488.

9 Id. at 481.
Id. at 493-96.
'0 Id. at 494, n.23, 496-97.
'o'Id. at 495-96, 499, 501.
'0

260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
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in the city of Pittston. 10 3 Invoking Pennsylvania's Kohler Act, which forbade
the removal of coal support pillars, they sued to enjoin mining that would cause
their house to subside into the ground."' 4 In addressing their claim, the court
observed that it was not called upon to consider the plaintiff's situation alone, but
that if it were, the protection of a single house from subsidence was not enough
of a public interest to justify destruction of the right to mine coal.' 0 5
Having said that, the Mahon Court then proceeded to explain that the case
had been treated as one that challenged the general validity of the Kohler Act, and
the court declared the act unconstitutional."' 6 The scope of the ruling seemed
sensible in view of the various interests that were represented before the court,
including the state of Pennsylvania and the city of Scranton. 07 Besides, the
plaintiffs, themselves, lived in a city and sought the Kohler Act's protection for
the inhabitants of cities.
The Keystone Court, however, saw Mahon quite differently than Mahon had
seen itself. Keystone held that the Court's apparent ruling on the general validity
of the Kohler Act went beyond what a decision in the case actually required.'0 8
Seen through the eyes of the Keystone court, Mahon presented only the case of
a single house and nothing more and decided only that protecting it did not justify
destruction of the right to mine coal."°9 Consequently, the Keystone Court
explained, everything that Mahon had said about the general validity of the
Kohler Act, including the polestar pronouncements about the doctrine of
regulatory takings was an advisory opinion." 0
As an advisory opinion, most of Mahon was weightless as a precedent, apart
from the unremarkable proposition that a regulatory destruction of private
property must be supported by a public purpose. 1 This meant that Mahon did
not actually rule upon how much coal a legislature can require to be left in the
ground to support surface communities after they have bargained away their
support rights. Keystone filled this gap, however. The answer was 27,000,000
tons provided profitable mining was still possible." 2 Four dissenting judges

'c

Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 492 (1922).
260 U.S. at 412.

'i

Id. at 414.

1o6Id.
107 id.
'"

480 U.S. at 483-84.

209 Id.

"0 Id. at 484.
. Id. at 484. See supra text accompanying notes 114-120.
2 480 U.S.
at 498.
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protested in vain.'

Keystone also mentioned another difference between Mahon and itself.
Keystone said that the Kohler Act in Mahon "made it 'commercially impracticable' to mine 'certain coal.' 114 What the Court meant to imply by this
statement is uncertain, however. The Court did not say that a protective law for
surface support in coal communities that made any anthracite mining unprofitable
would be invariably unconstitutional.
The coal industry was removing support pillars in the city of Scranton when
Mahon arose.' 1 5 Undoubtedly, the Kohler Act made such mining unprofitable
because the act forbade it. Keystone, however, did not condemn such protective
legislation although the challenged law in Keystone, which the Court upheld,
forbade such residual mining and made it equally unprofitable. 6
Moreover, there was no showing in Keystone or Mahon that profitable
anthracite'1 7 mining was generally impossible without removing the support
pillars for surface coal communities although these pillars may have constituted
one-fourth to one-third of the coal in an anthracite mine. In fact, anthracite
mining had been conducted for more than three decades when Mahon arose,118
and there was no indication that it was unprofitable until the support pillars were
removed. Therefore, the reference in Keystone to unprofitable mining in Mahon
left open the general, hypothetical, abstract question of whether the state can ever
forbid removal of coal support pillars for coal communities when the restriction
will make mining unprofitable.
In any event, Keystone makes it unmistakably clear that a legislature can
prohibit exercise of the right to remove coal support pillars to protect coal
communities overhead, provided profitable coal mining does not require removal
3 Id. at 506.

Id. at 484.
Id. at 498. Residual mining had caused cave-ins in Scranton before Mahon. See Rose, Mahon
Reconstructed: Why The Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle, 58 S. CAL L. REV. 561, 578-79 (1984).
14
'5

'" Id. 480 U.S. at 501. Secondary or residual mining, however, may be profitable without removing
support pillars for coal communities provided the mine has enough other coal. Still, it is apparent that
the mining restrictions in Keystone would make secondary mining become unprofitable when only these
support pillars remained in the mine, although operations were profitableuntil then. Further, it would
seem strange to hold that the constitution invalidates protective legislation for the support of surface land
in coal communities above profitably operated coal mines whose only coal, when the legislation is
enacted, is support pillars for these communities. The Keystone court, however, seems to have left this
situation unresolved although it may not arise.
'" See Mahon v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 498 (1922) (dissenting opinion of Justice Kephart);
Rose, MahonReconstructed: Why The Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle 57 S.CAL. L REV. 561,567, n.38
(1984). Compliance with the restrictions in Keystone may have required 2% of the coal to be left in the
ground; 480 U.S. at 496.
"s 260 U.S. 393, 412 (1922).
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of the pillars." 9 This judicial modification of Mahon brought Hadachek, Euclid
and Mahon in line with each other and the fair return model of the takings clause
and police power. Old Mahon, on the other hand, is the model of laissez faire
capitalism. This model of Mahon, the internal inconsistencies of the model and
the difficulty of reconciling it with Hadachek and Euclid will be discussed now.
A Laissez FaireModel of the Takings Clause and Police Power
Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon fits the laissez faire model of
government. The regulatory objective in Mahon was beyond the scope of the
police power. 120 A constitutional regime of laissez faire puts many objectives
beyond the scope of the police power. It also puts them beyond the reach of
everyone who wants or needs what they can provide when the free market makes
these objectives unattainable.
Mahon held that the objective of preserving the economic viability of the
community did not justify a severe disproportionate regulatory destruction of
property interests that, themselves, threatened the economic viability of the
community, but no other police power interests."' The objective of preserving
the economic viability of the community was not a valid governmental regulatory
This proposition, however, does not
objective under the circumstances.
provide an easy basis for distinguishing Mahon from Hadachek and Euclid.
Other apparent grounds for differentiation are equally unsuitable.
The land use in Hadachek, for example, can overpower neighboring uses,
and the weak may deserve the protection of the state from the strong. But
Hadachek was a congenial neighbor, initially, and, according to him and others,
everything suggested that he would be a congenial neighbor forever.'23 Still,
Hadachek ended up losing a large amount of property to make living congenial
for others. A comparable loss for the same purpose befell the real estate broker
in Euclid.124 Mahon, however, forbade a similar loss for a similar purpose.
One might also suggest that Hadachek's brick factory became a clog on free
market in real estate transactions. Similarly, heavy industrial use of the
undeveloped acreage in Euclid would have been a clog upon the rustic growth of
the village from the village green outwards. The coal industry in Mahon, on the
other hand, was merely going to add the finishing touch to real estate transactions

19 480 U.S. at 495-96, 499, 501.
i20 260 U.S. at 414.
"2 The court explained why conservation and safety did not justify the regulation; Id. at 413-14.
'22

id. at 414.

'- 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915).
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that had been fairly approved in the free market. But the finishing touch was
going to terminate the free market for some real estate transactions, as well as
other transactions, altogether. Destruction of a market will injure it more than a
clog.
Still, Hadachek and Euclid might be different than Mahon somehow.
Undoubtedly, the business undertakings of Hadachek and the real estate broker
in Euclid received less than the overwhelming support of the community when
they were first disclosed. Therefore, regulatory suppression might have been
initially anticipated in Hadachek and Euclid.
Almost everyone in Mahon, on the other hand, must have applauded the
arrangements for mining coal from the moment that they were made because of
the prosperity that they would bring. The state, however, did not intervene in
Mahon to protect the persons who made the arrangements or who provided the
applause at the ribbon-cutting ceremony to celebrate them. These persons did not
need any protection. They were going to become prosperous.
The Mahon Court's explanation of its decision does not provide a basis for
differentiation either. The Court seemed to say that the surface landowners would
simply lack any property to stand on for long, once the coal industry removed the
support pillars for their collapsible fee interests. 125 The court compared the
surface landowners to tenants who wanted to hold over after the lease had expired
without the consent of the landlord.126 In this respect, the court said that the
Pennsylvania legislature had tried to do more for the surface landowners than
recent valid rent control legislation that was addressed to the aftermath of World
War I had done for tenants.127 Finally, the Court said that this rent control
legislation had gone to the "verge of the law,"'2 which indirectly said that
peacetime rent control ordinarily would be beyond the verge and violate the
takings clause.
The court's analogy does reveal what was on its mind, but it also fails to
distinguish Mahon from Hadachek and Euclid. There would have been no
residential land for anyone to stand on near Hadachek's brick factory while this
land was filled with smoke. Homeowners in Euclid would have had no attractive
residential land sites to stand on if industry had bought them all.
The government objectives in Hadachek and Euclid required severe,
disproportionate loss of property that was held constitutional. The outcome in

"5 260 U.S. at 415.
'26 See id. at 416.
IZ7

Id.

128 Id.
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Mahon was inexplicably different. Mahon simply held that Pennsylvania's
regulatory objective was impermissible and, consequently, that the state's
regulation was a taking, but the Court did not say why. The explanation of
Mahon is not found in Mahon.
Hadacheck and Euclid hold that a severe regulatory loss of property is
permissible to make life in an urban industrial community viable. They say
nothing about such a sacrifice to prolong the life of a community beyond its time.
Mahon holds, on the other hand, that a severe regulatory loss of private property
is impermissible to permit a wasting asset community to survive its wasting asset
industry after property and contractual arrangements have been made to terminate
both together pursuant to prudent business practice.
The loss of a community due to business operations in the marketplace is
nothing unusual, especially in mining. Capital will go elsewhere when it happens,
and the people of the community can go elsewhere, too. Mobility of capital and
labor keeps the industrial system humming. Legislative interference with the
efficient operations of the marketplace would be foolish. It would impose a
severe, unjustifiable loss upon property and misallocate resources to the ultimate
loss of everyone. It is submitted that this is the reason why the Pennsylvania
legislature went "too far"'129 in Mahon.
The constitutional laissez faire system of the time had distinctions of this
kind. The market, itself, was virtually the exclusive regulator of rents, 30
prices13 ' and wages.13 2 Price control was permissible only for a business that
was affected with a public interest. 133 Only history, itself, affected inns, cabs
and grist mills with a public interest,'4 but the affectation was enough to permit
pervasive state regulation of these enterprises. 135 The ice business, however,

'29Id.

at 415.

'30Ordinary

peactime rent control was said to be unconstitutional in Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S.

543, 546-48 (1924); cf. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156-57 (1921); Pennsylvania Coal co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. at 416 (1922).
,'3
Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235,239-40 (1929), overruledby Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S.
236 (1941).
132Adkins
3

v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).

Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239-40 (1929), overruledby Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S.

236 (1941). Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations of Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 535-36 (1923)
said that there were three general classes of business that were affected with a public interest: (1) a
business that depended upon a public grant or franchise, such as a common carrier or a public utility; (2)
a business that was regarded as exceptional and affected with a public interest historically, such as an inn,
cab or grist mill; and (3) a business that grew to be of great importance to the public although it was not
affected with a public interest at its inception, such as banking or insurance. See L TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTiONAL LAw Sec. 8-4, at 570-74, n.24 (2nd ed. 1988).
'3 262 U.S. at 535.
133
Id.
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was not affected with a public interest, 136 whereas the business of operating a
cotton gin was so affected because1 37 it was like the business of operating a
grist mill. 138 The Supreme Court created and used the public interest doctrine
as a device to strike down price regulation except in situations where the Court's
vague divining wand indicated that the free market with the support of the
antitrust laws would not work efficiently with fairness. 39 Consequently, the
legislative function, and
Court's use of the public interest doctrine preempted the
40
ago1
time
some
reason
this
for
it
discarded
the Court
Related precedents also undid the rest of the constitutional system of laissez
faire.' 4 ' The rationale for Mahon went with it.' 42 State regulation of property
interests now conforms to the fair return model of the takings clause. It remains
to be considered, then, whether this model provides adequate advance notice of
regulatory loss to regulated property owners.
The issue of Adequate Advance Notice of
Regulatory Loss to Regulated Property Owners
Regulated property owners want advance notice of regulation in order to
have the opportunity to avoid regulatory loss of their property. What they would
like to have in the way of accommodation for this purpose, however, involves
more than notice. It is also impossible to provide it without unduly limiting the
police power.
It is usually easy for a property owner to receive notice of whether what he
wants to do with his property involves the possibility of losing it due to state
regulation. All that the property owner has to do is simply to think about the
possible consequences to others of the action that he would like to take. This
process would provide adequate notice of possible regulation to the reasonably

'36 New

State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 277 (1932).

117Id. at 273-76.
13

id.

"9 Hamilton, Affectation With Public Interest, 39 YALE LJ. 1089, 1101, 1107 (1930).

v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-31 (1963) (state can abolish the business of debt adjusting
based upon its own conception of what the public interest requires.); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236,
245-46 (1941) (state can prescribe maximum fee that employment agencies can charge for services to
executive, technical and professional workers.); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-32, 536 (1934).
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTruriONAL LAw 582 (2nd ed. 1988).
141See supra note 22.
See supra text
142 Keystone Bituminous Coals Ass'n v. De Benedictics, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
accompanying notes 94-119; Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. den. 400 U.S. 841
(1970) dismissed a constitutional challenge to New York City's rent control program in a single
paragraph. Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875 (1983) upheld an ordinary
peactime rent control ordinance on the merits by summarily disposing of a constitutional challenge to the
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1
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alert property owner. Nobody had to explain to Hadachek that a brick factory
precludes nearby residential development, or to tell the real estate broker in
Euclid that the common law of real property presents similar obstacles, or to give
notice to the coal industry in Mahon that removal of the coal support pillars for
the surface will cause the surface and any improvements thereon to collapse.
Regulated property owners obviously are not demanding this kind of notice
because they already have it. Instead, they want better notice. What they really
want is the constitutional freedom to act or to commit their investment principal
without being proscribed afterwards unless their action is illegal at the outset or
there is a high degree of certainty then that it will become illegal. 4 3
It is submitted that property owners expect too much. Giving this kind of
notice would require the state to enact regulations to fix things when they might
not get broken and to address problems that are completely unknowable until they
arise. Moreover, the law usually has some difficulty catching up with problems
that have existed for a long time. Occasionally, a problem solves itself before
regulation to address it is enacted. Rarely is the enactment of needed legislation
a complete surprise.
The property owner usually will have an opportunity to avoid regulatory
loss by investing his principal in an activity that will not elicit severe regulation.
Sometimes, however, regulatory loss will occur without any inkling, beforehand
that it was a possibility. It is impossible for the regulated property owner to
receive prior notice in this situation, but when notice is impossible, the
Constitution should not require it. The notice issue, then, is really a non-issue.
Discussion of a few situations that involve protective regulation of the environment will provide additional examples of what is meant.
A FAIR RETURN MODEL OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
AND THE POLICE POWER

Environmental Regulation
Occasionally, but rarely it would seem, a use of property may give it a
market value before there is any indication that some loss to the public may arise
from the use. Consequently, subsequent regulation that forbids the use would be
a genuine surprise for the property owner. Environmental regulation may be an
area where such a surprise is most likely, although cases of genuine surprise, even
here, may be as uncommon as some of the wildlife species that environmental
regulation protects.

"4See supra
accompanying notes 3-12,
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Environmental harm and protection have been around long enough to alert

the prospective investor in land that his investment may be at risk to environmental regulation. The stripmining of coal, for example, has always had an
obvious devastating impact on the environment.'" Consequently, it should not
have come as a surprise to anyone that constitutional congressional regulation for
the restoration
of stripmined areas seemed like an invitation to leave the coal in
45
the ground.
Wetlands protection has been upheld for some time. Just v. Marinette
County'46 was decided in 1972. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc., 4 7 the Supreme Court left open the possibility that some wetlands protection might be a taking of property, 41 but it also said that regulatory takings
hardly ever occur. 149 Recently, Maine and Vermont have successfully forbidden
real estate development that threatened deeryards in these states. 50

Such examples of environmental regulation may seem so commonplace that
they may not appear to implicate the takings clause at all. Other examples,
however, especially hypothetical situations, are extreme enough to test the limits
of the police power and the constitutional claim for notice of regulation that
destroys the value of property. The snail darter and the northern spotted owl
come readily to mind.

The snail darter almost killed a government dam.'

The last northern

4 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981) mentions
congressional findings that erosion, landslides, flooding, water pollution and destruction of soil and
wildlife habitat are some of harms that strimpmining causes.
14 Stripmine operators are required to restore stripmined land to its prior condition and approximate
original contour, to segregate and preserve the topsoil, to minimize disturbance to the hydrological balance
of the land, to construct coal mine waste piles used as dams or embankments, to revegetate the area and
to dispose of spoil; Id. at 269.
'4 56 Wis. 2d. 7, 21, 201 N.W.2d 761, 772 (1972) (state prohibition of filling-in wetlands was held
constitutional).
147 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
'48Id. at 128.
Id. at 126.
15 In Re Southview Associates 153 Vt. 171, 172, 174,569 A.2d 501, 504 (1989) (prohibition of a 33-unit
'49

residential development project for vacation homes to protect a herd of 20-50 deer was held authorized
by state law); Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Commission (Me.) 450 A2d.475,
482-83 (1982) (restricted timber harvesting upon 550 acres of a 25,000 acre township to protect a deer
herd permitted profitable operations and was held constitutional, and severe temporary restrictions upon
more than half the acreage of a 2700 acre deeryard were also upheld).
"' The habitat of the snail darter along the lowest stretch of the Little Tennessee River
was flooded out
after authority to do so was conferred by a surreptitious rider to an appropriations bill that became law,
see Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigmand its Ansequences, 19
Journal of Law Reform 805, 808, 813-14 (1986). Aflerwords, the darter was found in feeder streams, and
the Dept. of the Interior took the darter off of the endangered species list and classified it as a threatened
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1
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spotted owls of the last great old-growth forests may need the forests to survive.
Fortunately, for the owl, the government owns the forests. Protest over regulatory
property loss to save these species would have been deafening if they had lived
on private land. Withdrawal of public land from5 2use to save these species
brought on protests that received national publicity.
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,t53 the snail darter and the Endangered Species Act halted the commencement of operations for a one hundred
million dollar government dam, the Tellico dam in Tennessee. tm Construction
of the dam began in 1967.155 The Endangered Species Act was enacted in
1973. ts6 The darter was put on the endangered species list in 1975.57 The
Supreme Court ruled for the darter.158
Quite possibly, the risk of extinction of aquatic life from the construction
of dams in southern waters was known before work on the Tellico dam
began."5 9 For the purpose of discussion, however, it will be assumed that the
possibility of this risk occurred to nobody beforehand, and that the dam was
privately owned. Similarly, it will be assumed that the habitat of the northern
spotted owl is a privately-owned forest that was purchased for the harvest value
of its standing timber long before there was any known threat to the owl. It will
be assumed, in other words, that protective regulation in both cases is a complete
surprise that will destroy millions of dollars of investment in private property.
The simplicity and the necessity of the case for just compensation for these
losses may seem overwhelming. Besides, a constitutional system that once gave
the coal industry a constitutional right to destroy coal communities,' 6° and
might do so again,16 1 may not seem a very safe haven for the survival of
wildlife that is already near extinction. But simple problems with simple

Zygmunt J. B. Plater, the author of the cited work, is a professor of law at Boston College Law
School, and acted as counsel for the citizen plaintiffs who opposed the Tellico Dam. Id. at 805. See also,
Tenn. Valley Authority v. Hill, 439 U.S. 153, 155 (1978

15 Id. The northern spotted owl has also been classified as a threatened species, and the classification
might case the loss of many jobs in the Pacific Northwest. See Detroit Free Press, June 23, 1990, at 5A,
col. 1; Detroit Free Press, June 8, 1990, at IlA, col.
153437 U.S. 153 (1978).
"4

Id. at 156, 172.

,s Id. at 157.
'4 Id. at 159.
"4

Id. at 161.

"4

Id. at 169-70, 195.

'4 House committee hearings disclosed the total disappearance of a vast array of mollusks in southern

streams as the result of damming, channelization and pollution; Id. at 177, n.23.
"4 See supra text accompanying notes 78-101.
6 See supra
text accompanying notes
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solutions often obscure tragic results. Extreme cases are often extremely difficult
to decide. This is especially true when private property or the interests of the
police power must absorb a loss for which neither is responsible.
In such situations, the state, which must always play catch-up in enacting
regulations, can not possibly foresee what is impossible for private enterprise to
foresee, namely, the destruction of a species from private entrepreneurial activity.
Unfortunately, the knowledge that private enterprise, itself, needs to avoid loss of
a species is not forthcoming until a severe loss of something becomes inevitable.
Moreover, the legislature is not likely to mandate a surprise sacrifice of private
property that is extremely severe to save a species whose survival is questionable.
Therefore, the enactment of protective legislation under these circumstances, if it
were to occur, would show with adequate certainty that the value of the protected
interest, at least, would approach the value of the property lost from regulation,
although the two interests, admittedly, involve different values. 162
It is submitted that, in these two extraordinary situations, the state should
have the power to place the loss upon private investment principal. There are
only three places where the loss can fall. They are accumulated, man-made
capital, labor or the natural capital stock.
Like the police power, itself, labor or the general taxpayer is usually playing
catch-up with the market. Further, the general taxpayer may be almost as
insolvent as the government or heavy-laden with debt even if he is financially
afloat. Thus, the general taxpayer may not be the best place for a large
unforeseeable loss to come to rest, with so many foreseeable losses for him to
absorb, while the chant of no new taxes is whispered throughout the land.
The natural capital stock may not be a very good place for the loss either.
The needs of the industrial system are constantly diminishing it. Many intelligent
persons seem to think that this depletion simply has to stop and that the industrial
system has already destroyed too much of the natural endowment.
This appears to be the theme of T.VA. v Hill.63 Parts of Chief Justice
Burger's opinion for the Court might persuade anyone of the need for protective

In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 473 U.S. 153, 187 (1978). the Court said that making the
utilitarian calculations that would be needed to determine the comparative worth of the endangered snail
darter and the endangered government dam was incompatible with the exercise of Article III federal
judicial power under the constitution.
16

163

Id.
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environmental regulation.'6 It is true that the issues before tCourt involved a
survival choice between a government dam and a government-protected snail
darter and, therefore, did not activate the takings clause. But the case also seems
to speak to broader issues. The government is not the only institution that knows
how to wreck the environment
Accumulated capital, then, remains for consideration as the place for a large,
unforeseeable, single-shock, survivable loss to fall. Accumulated capital is a very
endurable institution. Arguably, it is the greatest survivor of them all. It
probably can absorb such a loss with the least amount of suffering all around.
The market, itself, frequently administers large losses to accumulated
capital. Devastation in the nation's rust belt and central cities and losses in the
savings and loan industry show what the market can do to capital in prosperous
times. Moreover, the market constantly replenishes and increases accumulated
capital. Therefore, accumulated capital ought to be able to absorb a catastrophic,
but survivable loss occasionally. Letting the loss fall upon the capital of the
enterprise from which the risk of loss arises may be necessary to preserve the
general taxpayer and the natural endowment.
This proposal is obviously shocking. Any altemative proposal, however,
may be almost equally shocking. Perhaps, it would be more civil to say what the
Supreme Court said when Virginia chose apple orchards over red cedar trees in
a situation that required a survival choice. 65 But this civility would leave too
much unsaid.
It might also be more soft-spoken to say, as the Supreme Court has said on
several occasions, that the state needs a large discretion in allocating the risks of
the industrial system. 6 6 However one prefers to say it, some vital interests
occasionally have to be sacrificed to protect other vital interests that are also at
risk. The state can do a much better job of making the survival decisions than
the marketplace. The free market, itself, has the capacity to deliver unsurpassable
shock.

" Half of the extinction of mammals within the past two thousand years had occurred during the most
recent fifty-year period. Id. at 176. Extinction of species threatens a genetic heritage of incalculable
value, Id. at 177-78. Congress was concerned about the unknown uses that endangered species might
have and their unforeseeable place in the chain of life on this planet. Id. at 178-79.
16 See supra text accompanying n.38.
Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986) (retroactive increase in
employer pension obligations for employers who withdraw from multi-employer pension plans held
constitutional); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. 428 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1976) (retroactive imposition
upon employers in coal industry of obligation to pay disability benefits for pneumoconiosis held
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The FairnessOf The FairReturn Model Of The Takings Clause
It is easy to make a brief statement about the fairness of this model. The
fair return model permits regulation of private property that allows all of the
benefits of the modem welfare state. Child labor is gone.' 7 The constitutional
sweatshop for the employer is also gone. 168 It has been replaced with a
legislated minimum wage.' 69 State protection of labor unions brought improvements in wages, hours and working conditions.17' The national government
established a social security system and made numerous other benefits and
amenities available.
The regulated marketplace provided all of these benefits after it seemed that
the free market would withhold them forever. Further, all of this was done with
regulation that allowed at least a fair return upon investment. It is possible that
the system that provided these benefits also increased the nation's per capita
production of millionaires.
Yet the constitutional system that did all of this may now itself be at risk.
There may always be a constituency for laissez faire that would like to get what
it wants without having to convince the legislative and executive branches of
government of the desirability of its program.17' Some spokespersons for
laissez faire may now be sitting on the high Court again. A new configuration
of judges on the supreme bench auspiciously suggests the restoration of a laissez
faire regime of constitutional law. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission"'
is only one recent case that shows the direction in which the Court may go.

'7 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 108, 116-117 (1941) upheld the federal Fair Labor Standards

Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201, et. seq. as an exercise of Congress commerce power and overruled

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Sec. 211 of the act contains child labor provisions.
'6' West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) upheld a minimum wage law for women
and overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
169Id.
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1 (1937) upheld the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935.
' Former Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson said the following about the constitutional struggle
over the New Deal: "Life tenure was a device by which the conservatives could thwart a liberal
administration if they could outlive it. The alternations of our national mood are such that a cycle of
liberal government seldom exceeds eight years, and by living through them the court could go on without
decisive liberal infusion. So well has this strategy worked that never in its entire history can the court
be said to have for a single hour been representative of anything except the relatively conservative forces
of its day." JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 187 (1941).
'70

'7 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
Taking The City To The Seashore

173

-

The Nollans were married and had been the tenants in a California beach
bungalow for a long time."7 4 Initially, the bungalow was small and primitive.1 75 Eventually, it became decrepit. 76 The city, however, was beginning
to come to the beach area near the bungalow, and the Nollans' lease had an
The Nollans decided to exercise the option. 78 In
option to purchase.'
keeping with what exercising the option would require and what was taking place
in the neighborhood,' 79 they wanted to replace the bungalow with a two-story
house and an attached two-car garage. 8 Making these improvements would
have constituted a five-fold increase in the development of their lot,' 8' and the
Nollans were required to get a permit to make them from the California Coastal
Commission.' 82
183
The beach was public tideland seaward from the mean high tidemark.
The commission was apprehensive that intensive residential development of the
beach,'" including some expansion seaward, would deter the public from
walking along the beach. The Nollans' lot was about midway between two public
beaches,' 8 and the commission wanted to protect public access to them along
the seashore.'" Consequently, the commission insisted upon the dedication of
a ten-foot strip of private beachfront property for public access along the beach
as a condition for allowing the city to come to the beach.IU

A five-justice Supreme Court majority' 8 refused to see the commission's
program as a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting needs of adjacent

173id.
74 Id.
"7

at 827.

id.

17 id.
177

id.

"7

Id. at 829-30.

"'Id.at 828.
Id. at 856.
181 Id.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 827.

'

Id. at 828-29, 835-36.

"'

IEId. at 827.
'Id.
'87

at 828-29.

Id. at 828, 853.
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landowners."8 9 Instead, they viewed the dedication requirement as a regulatory
landgrab' 90 and, therefore, a violation of the takings clause because the state did
not pay compensation. 91 This ruling must have been frustrating enough for a
state agency that has the delicate task of preserving a precious natural resource
from an onslaught of overdevelopment upon nearby land. But the supreme Court
decided to increase the delicacy of the task.
The Court implied that, apart from the dedication requirement, the
commission's restrictive regulations for beachfront development might be out of
date and in need of revision.192 The court seemed to suggest, in other words,
that when the city is ready to go to the seashore, what may be needed is a
construction of the takings clause that will require appropriate deregulation and
let the free market facilitate this development. 193 A free market that has a
constitutional right to take the city to the seashore can take the city anywhere.
It can take the city to the suburbs, to the countryside and to special enclaves of
charm within urban metropolitan areas.
Taking The City Elsewhere
Golden v. Planning Board of The Town of Ramapo'94 allowed a town to
delay new residential subdivision for a generation until provision could be made
1 95
for related public services that may have been only vaguely forthcoming.
This long delay of residential development in part to preserve the suburban charm
of the town' 96 also delayed satisfaction of an urgent need for housing 9 7
although the eventual urbanization of the town was a foregone conclusion.!9"
The precedential value of Ramapo seems dubious after Nollan. Equally suspect
are the cases that hold that a large minimum lot size to preserve the rural

M Id. at 838-39, n. 6.
190Id.
'9'

Id. at 841-42.

'9 The Court suggested that the challenged permit system of the California Coastal Commission may have

been too restrictive to accommodate the demand for more intensive beachfront development when it said:

"One would expect that a regime in which this kind of the leveraging of the police power is
allowed would produce stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other
purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals purportedly sought to be served than would
result from more lenient (but nontradable) development restrictions. Thus, the improtance of the purpose
underlying the prohibition not only does not justify3 the imposition of unrelated conditions for eliminating
the prohibition, but positively militates against the practice." Id. at 837-38, n.5 (emphasis in original).
193 Id.
'9 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
9

Id. at 372-73, 285 N.E.2d at 303-04.

196 Id.
197 Id.

at 365-66, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol25/iss1/1
19 Id. at 371-72, 285 N.E.2d at 302-03.

34

Clarke: Takings Clause
Summer, 1991]

TAKINGS CLAUSE

character of a community is constitutional and raises only legislative issues.

99

The implications of Nollan also seem to conflict with Agins v. City of
Tiburon,2°° a case that Nollan expressly approved for the proposition that the
police power permits land use regulation to create scenic zones.20 ' Tiburon is
on San Francisco Bay.2 2 It has aquatic facilities, a temperate climate and is
close to San Francisco. 2°3 In 1979, it was also relatively uncrowded, having a
population of approximately 6,000 persons living on 1,676 acres of land, or 3.6
persons per acre .21 Suburban land values in Tiburon were also the highest in
California then.20 5
All of this suggests that Tiburon might have been one of the world's most
charming places to live. The city wanted to keep its charm. It prescribed one
acre of land as the minimum lot size for a home.2°
This requirement frustrated the plans of a land developer who owned five
acres of ridgelands with "magnificent views of San Francisco Bay and the scenic
surrounding areas. '20 7 The value of his land was the highest in Tiburon and,
therefore, the most valuable suburban land in California.0 8 The Supreme Court,
however, held that the lot size requirement was constitutional on its face, but left
open the possibility that it might be unconstitutional as applied. 209 Justice Clark
of the California Supreme Court had dissented on constitutional grounds, 210 and
his dissent included a protest that the lot size requirement created a special
21
residential enclave for the wealthy. '
The constitution, of course, would not prevent the California Supreme Court
or legislature from nullifying this plan for pleasant living if the plan were to
violate state law. Construing the takings clause, however, to forbid the legislative

'9 Ybarra v. City of The Town Of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 252, 254 (9th Cir. 1974) (one acre
minimum lot size); Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma 522 F.2d
897, 908 (9th Cir., 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
200 447 U.S. 255 (1980).

20'

483 U.S. at 835.

202 Agins v. City Of Tiburon, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 373, 598 P.2d 25, 26 (1979).
203

Id.

204Id.
213 447 U.S. at 258.
206 Id.
207

at 257.

Id. at 258.

208Id.
2 9 Id.
2'0

at 262-63.

157 Cal. Rptr. at 380, 590 P.2d at 32.

211 Id.

at 385, 590 P.2d at 35.
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process from prescribing the plan might mean that the Tiburons of the nation,
probably few in number at best, would disappear. The free market might not let
them exist.
Still, a takings clause that would compel the California Coastal Commission
to permit intensive development of the California beach areas may subject other
special enclaves to the risk of overdevelopment, too. A beachhead anywhere for
any purpose seems futile if its possessor has to remain on the beach. It is
possible, on the other hand, that Nollan will leave unruffled all of the land use
law that it threatens to disarrange. Instead, Nollan may be a beachhead for the
restoration of freedom of contract as a constitutional substantive right.
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT

Restoration of freedom of contract as a constitutional substantive right might
appear suspect if the right were to begin its new reign in splendid isolation
without any related, supporting constitutional rights. The right has been gone for
a long time.212 Sudden and inexplicable change in construing the nation's
fundamental charter might be more alarming than a surprise regulation of property
rights. The return of constitutional freedom of contract, however, might appear
natural if one or two courtiers were already waiting to provide a reception. The
commerce clause and the takings clause could send them ahead beforehand.
213

Recently, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
there was controversy in the Supreme Court over whether application of the
federal minimum wage law to state and local government enterprise was an
unconstitutional affront to the sovereign dignity of the states. 214 The validity
of the law's application to private employers who were engaged in similar activity
was said to be unquestionable.215 Moreover, earlier, National League of Cities
v. Usery?2 6 had held in a 5 to 4 decision2 17 that the federal law did offend, 2' s and Cities also overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 2 19 which eight years
earlier had held that the federal law gave no offense.2 0 Then, nine years after

2 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-31 (1963). See supra note 140.
213469 U.S. 528 (1985). reh den, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985).
214
The constitutional issue was whether the comnrce power of congress allowed it to regulate the wages
and hours of state and local government employees whose employment involved tradtional, sovereign,
governmental functions; Id. at 530, 537-38.
21-Id. at 537.
226426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled by Garcia,469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
227 Id. at 856, 880.

218Id. at 845, 851-52.
29 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (overruled by Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). See 426 U.S. at 855.
= 392 U.S. at 198-99.
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Cities, Garcia held in a 5 to 4 decision
that the federal law
did not ofa
fendm2 and Garcia repaired the error of Cities by overnling it.r
Justice Rehnquist, however, who had written for the Court in Cities,'
confidently predicted a constitutional comeback for Cities in his brief dissenting
22 5 The restoration of Cities would give state and local
opinion in Garcia.
government employers the constitutional freedom of contract to operate a
sweatshop as a sovereign prerogative rather than a fundamental right under the
due process clause. It would also make the return of freedom of contract for
private employers seem natural. Constitutional freedom of contract of this
dimension would also make the marketplace rather than the legislature the
regulator of wages.
The takings clause can also help to provide some company for a constitutional freedom of contract in the private sector. Pennsylvania Coal Company v.
Mahon,"6 essentially, was a freedom of contract case.
In Mahon, all of the
arrangements for coal mining that destroyed the communities in Pennsylvania's
anthracite region were contractual.228
The takings clause protected these
contractual arrangements because they were property229. Moreover, in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. De Benedictis, 2s0 the four dissenting justices did
23
not want Keystone to overrule Mahon in effect or to modify it in any way. 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion in Keystone.232 Although
he did not predict a constitutional comeback for Mahon, its chance for such a
comeback is as good as the one for Cities.
Mahon also indirectly said that ordinary peacetime rent control violates the
takings clause.233 Chief Justice Rehnquist has indicated that he shares this

22

469 U.S. at 557.

m Id. at 531, 556-57.
22

Id.

2m

426 U.S. at 835.

22 469 U.S. at 579-80.
226 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
z27

Id. at 413-15.

ra Id.
229

Id. at 415.

2" 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
3'
2

Id. at 507-09.
Id. at 507.
260 U.S. at 416. See text accompanying notes 126-27.
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opinion.234 Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor clearly share this opinion, and

they said so recently, in Pennell v. City of San Jose,235 which involved a takings
clause challenge to provisions for rent relief for hardship tenants in a rent control
ordinance.13' The Supreme Court, however, decided to put on hold the question
of whether rent control in ordinary peacetime conditions is compatible with the
takings clause by dismissing the case for its failure to raise a concrete controversy
about this issue. 237 A constitution that made the marketplace the only ordinary
regulator of rents and wages would eventually give it exclusive power over almost
all prices, too.

Freedom of contract can aspire to constitutional right status again even
through this right lacks specific textual support in the provisions of the

Constitution. The right to marry and to have children also lacks such specific
textual support.

pinion 239

In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,2 38 a four-justice plurality o-

said that this right is a constitutional substantive right that is secured

by the due process clause because the judgment of time has approved the right
as one that is essential. 240 But parental rights for the father of a child whose
mother is married to and living with another man when the child is conceived and
born are not fundamental, according to this four-justice opinion. The reason is

that time has condemned parental rights for such a father.24 '

Recognized essentiality over time can do for the right to contract what it
can do for the right to marry and to have children. Arguably, the right to contract
is as essential as the right to marry. Everyone has the right to contract except
persons who lack the capacity to manage their own affairs. All that freedom of
contract lacks at the moment is a Supreme Court declaration of its fundamental

24 Justice Rehnquist dissented from the summary disposition of the appeal in Fresh Pond Shopping

Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875, 878 (1983) for lack of a substantial federal question. The Court
left intact a rent control ordinance that prohibited a landlord from demolishing a six-unit apartment
building in which only one unit was occupied. Id. at 875. Justice Rehnquist said, however, that the
constitutionality of ordinary peacetime rent control was an open question under Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135 (1921) and that the challenged ordinance also failed to compensate the landowner for the loss of
control of his property. Id. at 878. Further, dissenting in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De
Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 506, 508, Chief Justice Rehnquist approved Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922) where the Court indicated that ordinary peactime rent control went beyond the verge
of the law. Id. at 416. See supra text accompanying n. 130, n.142.
2' 485 U.S. 1, 15, 20-21 (1988) (dissenting opinion).
2m Id. at 8-9.
237

Id. at 9-10.

239 491

U.S. 110 (1989), reh den, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 492 U.S. 937 (1989).

239 Justice Scalia was the author of the opinion which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in its entirety.

Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy joined all of the opinion except note 6 thereof which emphasizes
identification of the most specific level at which a right traditionally has received protection or has been
denied protection in determining whether it is fundamental. Id. at 113, 127-28.
240 Id. at 123-24.
241

Id. at 124, 129.
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right status and a laissez faire gloss of the kind that Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor want to add to the takings clause.
Justice Kennedy did not join the Court in time to participate in Pennell, the
rent control case, or in Keystone, which was decided a year earlier. 242 He did
join the four-judge plurality opinion in Michael H., however.2 3 Justice Souter,
of course, has not yet had the opportunity to declare himself on the issues that
these cases raise. Further, Justice Marshall's successor probably will be sitting
on the Court soon with an outlook on constitutional law that, most likely, will be
the opposite of the outlook of Justice Marshall.
Thus, laissez faire will soon be silently making its rounds in the Supreme
Court amidst a new alignment of conservative judges. Unlike popular support for
the New Deal and welfare capitalism, no mass movement supports the return of
a constitutional regime of laissez faire. But no mass movement opposes such a
regime either. The issue does not even seem to be on the public mind at all.
With no decisive election returns to follow and the attention of the
president, congress and the public apparently drawn to other matters, the Supreme
Court may be tempted to lead where only a few may want to go. The court may
soon try its hand at governing some of the nation's problems. Like some
members of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, they
may see the modem regulatory welfare state as the cause of the nation's problems
and the marketplace as the cure.
In any event, the Supreme Court definitely has constitutional laissez faire
on its mind. The opportunity for its return may soon be there, and opportunity
that is not seized can quickly vanish, even when appearances suggest that it may
be long-lasting. The return of constitutional laissez faire would almost certainly
assure it a long stay, even though it would put the government in an economic
straightjacket and might set off the people and the Supreme Court in opposite
directions. History could repeat itself again, of course, even in the Supreme
Court, and make laissez faire go away once more. But in the Supreme Court, the
process obviously requires a much longer time.
Moreover, the Supreme Court does not have a constitutional mandate to
provide a permanent solution for the economic and fiscal problems of the nation.
The Court is not to blame for these problems. It cannot possibly solve them, and
242 Justice Kennedy took his oath of office and assumed Office on February 18, 1988.

484 U.S. iv.

Pennell v. City of San Jose, 488 U.S. 1 (1988) was argued on November 10, 1987 and decided on
February 24, 1988. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration decision of the case. Id. 15.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. De Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) was decided on March 9,
1987.
24' 491 U.S.
at 113.
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the issue of modest, ameliorative distribution of the nation's wealth should be
none of the Court's business.
The legislative process can distribute wealth downward, upward or not at
all, as recent and past history plainly shows. A fair return for capital that makes
it rich and provides the people with more benefits than is possible with a laissez
faire system cannot justly be called an exercise in grand larceny. A Supreme
Court that took these welfare benefits away from the people would never be able
to persuade the people that it was merely returning them to their true owners or
that the constitution required such a massive give-back. The Supreme Court,
itself, might end up looking like the thief. The dismantling of the modem welfare
state does not belong on the Court's agenda.
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